defensive-coding-guide/en-US/Tasks-Packaging.xml
2017-10-20 12:09:03 +00:00

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<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8' ?>
<!DOCTYPE chapter PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.5//EN" "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.5/docbookx.dtd" [
]>
<chapter id="chap-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-Packaging">
<title>RPM Packaging</title>
<para>
This chapter deals with security-related concerns around RPM
packaging. It has to be read in conjunction with
distribution-specific packaging guidelines.
</para>
<section id="sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-Packaging-Certificates">
<title>Generating X.509 self-signed certificates during
installation</title>
<para>
Some applications need X.509 certificates for authentication
purposes. For example, a single private/public key pair could
be used to define cluster membership, enabling authentication
and encryption of all intra-cluster communication. (Lack of
certification from a CA matters less in such a context.) For
such use, generating the key pair at package installation time
when preparing system images for use in the cluster is
reasonable. For other use cases, it is necessary to generate
the key pair before the service is started for the first time,
see <xref linkend="sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-Packaging-Certificates-Service"/>,
and <ulink url="https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Packaging:Initial_Service_Setup#Generating_Self-Signed_Certificates">Packaging:Initial Service Setup</ulink>.
</para>
<important>
<para>
The way the key is generated may not be suitable for key
material of critical value. (<command>openssl
genrsa</command> uses, but does not require, entropy from a
physical source of randomness, among other things.) Such keys
should be stored in a hardware security module if possible,
and generated from random bits reserved for this purpose
derived from a non-deterministic physical source.
</para>
</important>
<para>
In the spec file, we define two RPM variables which contain the
names of the files used to store the private and public key, and
the user name for the service:
</para>
<informalexample>
<programlisting language="RPM Spec">
# Name of the user owning the file with the private key
%define tlsuser %{name}
# Name of the directory which contains the key and certificate files
%define tlsdir %{_sysconfdir}/%{name}
%define tlskey %{tlsdir}/%{name}.key
%define tlscert %{tlsdir}/%{name}.crt
</programlisting>
</informalexample>
<para>
These variables likely need adjustment based on the needs of the
package.
</para>
<para>
Typically, the file with the private key needs to be owned by
the system user which needs to read it,
<literal>%{tlsuser}</literal> (not <literal>root</literal>). In
order to avoid races, if the <emphasis>directory</emphasis>
<literal>%{tlsdir}</literal> is <emphasis>owned by the services
user</emphasis>, you should use the code in <xref
linkend="ex-Defensive_Coding-Packaging-Certificates-Owned"/>.
The invocation of <application>su</application> with the
<option>-s /bin/bash</option> argument is necessary in case the
login shell for the user has been disabled.
</para>
<example id="ex-Defensive_Coding-Packaging-Certificates-Owned">
<title>Creating a key pair in a user-owned directory</title>
<programlisting language="Bash">
%post
if [ $1 -eq 1 ] ; then
if ! test -e %{tlskey} ; then
su -s /bin/bash \
-c "umask 077 &amp;&amp; openssl genrsa -out %{tlskey} 2048 2>/dev/null" \
%{tlsuser}
fi
if ! test -e %{tlscert} ; then
cn="Automatically generated certificate for the %{tlsuser} service"
req_args="-key %{tlskey} -out %{tlscert} -days 7305 -subj \"/CN=$cn/\""
su -s /bin/bash \
-c "openssl req -new -x509 -extensions usr_cert $req_args" \
%{tlsuser}
fi
fi
%files
%dir %attr(0755,%{tlsuser},%{tlsuser]) %{tlsdir}
%ghost %attr(0600,%{tlsuser},%{tlsuser}) %config(noreplace) %{tlskey}
%ghost %attr(0644,%{tlsuser},%{tlsuser}) %config(noreplace) %{tlscert}
</programlisting>
</example>
<para>
The files containing the key material are marked as ghost
configuration files. This ensures that they are tracked in the
RPM database as associated with the package, but RPM will not
create them when the package is installed and not verify their
contents (the <literal>%ghost</literal>), or delete the files
when the package is uninstalled (the
<literal>%config(noreplace)</literal> part).
</para>
<para>
If the <emphasis>directory</emphasis>
<literal>%{tlsdir}</literal> <emphasis>is owned by</emphasis>
<literal>root</literal>, use the code in <xref
linkend="ex-Defensive_Coding-Packaging-Certificates-Unowned"/>.
</para>
<example id="ex-Defensive_Coding-Packaging-Certificates-Unowned">
<title>Creating a key pair in a <literal>root</literal>-owned directory</title>
<programlisting language="Bash">
%post
if [ $1 -eq 1 ] ; then
if ! test -e %{tlskey} ; then
(umask 077 &amp;&amp; openssl genrsa -out %{tlskey} 2048 2>/dev/null)
chown %{tlsuser} %{tlskey}
fi
if ! test -e %{tlscert} ; then
cn="Automatically generated certificate for the %{tlsuser} service"
openssl req -new -x509 -extensions usr_cert \
-key %{tlskey} -out %{tlscert} -days 7305 -subj "/CN=$cn/"
fi
fi
%files
%dir %attr(0755,root,root]) %{tlsdir}
%ghost %attr(0600,%{tlsuser},%{tlsuser}) %config(noreplace) %{tlskey}
%ghost %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{tlscert}
</programlisting>
</example>
<para>
In order for this to work, the package which generates the keys
must require the <application>openssl</application> package. If
the user which owns the key file is generated by a different
package, the package generating the certificate must specify a
<literal>Requires(pre):</literal> on the package which creates
the user. This ensures that the user account will exist when it
is needed for the <application>su</application> or
<application>chmod</application> invocation.
</para>
</section>
<section id="sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-Packaging-Certificates-Service">
<title>Generating X.509 self-signed certificates before service
start</title>
<para>
An alternative way to automatically provide an X.509 key pair is
to create it just before the service is started for the first
time. This ensures that installation images which are created
from installed RPM packages receive different key material.
Creating the key pair at package installation time (see <xref
linkend="sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-Packaging-Certificates"/>)
would put the key into the image, which may or may not make
sense. </para>
<important>
<para>
The caveats about the way the key is generated in <xref
linkend="sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-Packaging-Certificates"/>
apply to this procedure as well.
</para>
</important>
<para>
Generating key material before service start may happen very
early during boot, when the kernel randomness pool has not yet
been initialized. Currently, the only way to check for the
initialization is to look for the kernel message
<literal>random: nonblocking pool is initialized</literal>, or
ensure that the application used for generating the keys
is utilizing the <filename>getrandom()</filename> system call.
</para>
<para>
In theory, it is also possible to use an application which reads from
<filename>/dev/random</filename> while generating the key
material (instead of <filename>/dev/urandom</filename>), but
this can block not just during the boot process, but also much
later at run time, and generally results in a poor user
experience.
</para>
<para>
The requirements for generating such keys is documented at
<ulink url="https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Packaging:Initial_Service_Setup#Generating_Self-Signed_Certificates">Packaging:Initial Service Setup</ulink>.
</para>
</section>
</chapter>