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<div class="col-xs-12 col-sm-9 col-md-9 main">
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<div class="page-header">
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<h2>File System Manipulation</h2>
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</div>
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<div id="preamble">
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<div class="sectionbody">
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<div class="paragraph">
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<p>In this chapter, we discuss general file system manipulation, with
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a focus on access files and directories to which an other,
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potentially untrusted user has write access.</p>
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</div>
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<div class="paragraph">
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<p>Temporary files are covered in their own chapter, <a href="#chap-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-Temporary_Files">[chap-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-Temporary_Files]</a>.</p>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div class="sect1">
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<h2 id="sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-File_System-Unowned"><a class="anchor" href="#sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-File_System-Unowned"></a>Working with Files and Directories Owned by Other Users</h2>
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<div class="sectionbody">
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<div class="paragraph">
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<p>Sometimes, it is necessary to operate on files and directories
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owned by other (potentially untrusted) users. For example, a
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system administrator could remove the home directory of a user,
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or a package manager could update a file in a directory which is
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owned by an application-specific user. This differs from
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accessing the file system as a specific user; see
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<a href="#sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-File_System-Foreign">Accessing the File System as a Different User</a>.</p>
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</div>
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<div class="paragraph">
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<p>Accessing files across trust boundaries faces several
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challenges, particularly if an entire directory tree is being
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traversed:</p>
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</div>
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<div class="olist arabic">
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<ol class="arabic">
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<li>
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<p>Another user might add file names to a writable directory at
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any time. This can interfere with file creation and the
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order of names returned by <code>readdir</code>.</p>
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</li>
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<li>
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<p>Merely opening and closing a file can have side effects.
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For instance, an automounter can be triggered, or a tape
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device rewound. Opening a file on a local file system can
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block indefinitely, due to mandatory file locking, unless
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the <code>O_NONBLOCK</code> flag is specified.</p>
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</li>
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<li>
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<p>Hard links and symbolic links can redirect the effect of
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file system operations in unexpected ways. The
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<code>O_NOFOLLOW</code> and
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<code>AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW</code> variants of system
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calls only affected final path name component.</p>
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</li>
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<li>
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<p>The structure of a directory tree can change. For example,
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the parent directory of what used to be a subdirectory
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within the directory tree being processed could suddenly
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point outside that directory tree.</p>
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</li>
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</ol>
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</div>
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<div class="paragraph">
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<p>Files should always be created with the
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<code>O_CREAT</code> and <code>O_EXCL</code> flags,
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so that creating the file will fail if it already exists. This
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guards against the unexpected appearance of file names, either
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due to creation of a new file, or hard-linking of an existing
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file. In multi-threaded programs, rather than manipulating the
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umask, create the files with mode <code>000</code> if
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possible, and adjust it afterwards with
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<code>fchmod</code>.</p>
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</div>
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<div class="paragraph">
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<p>To avoid issues related to symbolic links and directory tree
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restructuring, the “<code>at</code>” variants of system
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calls have to be used (that is, functions like
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<code>openat</code>, <code>fchownat</code>,
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<code>fchmodat</code>, and
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<code>unlinkat</code>, together with
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<code>O_NOFOLLOW</code> or
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<code>AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW</code>). Path names passed to
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these functions must have just a single component (that is,
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without a slash). When descending, the descriptors of parent
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directories must be kept open. The missing
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<code>opendirat</code> function can be emulated with
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<code>openat</code> (with an
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<code>O_DIRECTORY</code> flag, to avoid opening special
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files with side effects), followed by
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<code>fdopendir</code>.</p>
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</div>
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<div class="paragraph">
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<p>If the “<code>at</code>” functions are not available, it
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is possible to emulate them by changing the current directory.
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(Obviously, this only works if the process is not multi-threaded.)
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<code>fchdir</code> has to be used to change the current
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directory, and the descriptors of the parent directories have to
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be kept open, just as with the “<code>at</code>”-based
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approach. <code>chdir("…​")</code> is unsafe because it
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might ascend outside the intended directory tree.</p>
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</div>
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<div class="paragraph">
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<p>This “<code>at</code>” function emulation is currently
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required when manipulating extended attributes. In this case,
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the <code>lsetxattr</code> function can be used, with a
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relative path name consisting of a single component. This also
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applies to SELinux contexts and the
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<code>lsetfilecon</code> function.</p>
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</div>
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<div class="paragraph">
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<p>Currently, it is not possible to avoid opening special files
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<strong>and</strong> changes to files with hard links if the
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directory containing them is owned by an untrusted user.
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(Device nodes can be hard-linked, just as regular files.)
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<code>fchmodat</code> and <code>fchownat</code>
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affect files whose link count is greater than one. But opening
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the files, checking that the link count is one with
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<code>fstat</code>, and using
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<code>fchmod</code> and <code>fchown</code> on
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the file descriptor may have unwanted side effects, due to item
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2 above. When creating directories, it is therefore important
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to change the ownership and permissions only after it has been
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fully created. Until that point, file names are stable, and no
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files with unexpected hard links can be introduced.</p>
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</div>
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<div class="paragraph">
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<p>Similarly, when just reading a directory owned by an untrusted
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user, it is currently impossible to reliably avoid opening
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special files.</p>
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</div>
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<div class="paragraph">
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<p>There is no workaround against the instability of the file list
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returned by <code>readdir</code>. Concurrent
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modification of the directory can result in a list of files
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being returned which never actually existed on disk.</p>
|
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</div>
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<div class="paragraph">
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<p>Hard links and symbolic links can be safely deleted using
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<code>unlinkat</code> without further checks because
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deletion only affects the name within the directory tree being
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processed.</p>
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</div>
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</div>
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</div>
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<div class="sect1">
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<h2 id="sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-File_System-Foreign"><a class="anchor" href="#sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-File_System-Foreign"></a>Accessing the File System as a Different User</h2>
|
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<div class="sectionbody">
|
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<div class="paragraph">
|
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<p>This section deals with access to the file system as a specific
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user. This is different from accessing files and directories owned by a
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different, potentially untrusted user; see <a href="#sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-File_System-Foreign">Accessing the File System as a Different User</a>.</p>
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</div>
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<div class="paragraph">
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<p>One approach is to spawn a child process which runs under the
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target user and group IDs (both effective and real IDs). Note
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that this child process can block indefinitely, even when
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processing regular files only. For example, a special FUSE file
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system could cause the process to hang in uninterruptible sleep
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inside a <code>stat</code> system call.</p>
|
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</div>
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<div class="paragraph">
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<p>An existing process could change its user and group ID using
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<code>setfsuid</code> and <code>setfsgid</code>.
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(These functions are preferred over <code>seteuid</code>
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and <code>setegid</code> because they do not allow the
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impersonated user to send signals to the process.) These
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functions are not thread safe. In multi-threaded processes,
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these operations need to be performed in a single-threaded child
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process. Unexpected blocking may occur as well.</p>
|
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</div>
|
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<div class="paragraph">
|
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<p>It is not recommended to try to reimplement the kernel
|
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permission checks in user space because the required checks are
|
|
complex. It is also very difficult to avoid race conditions
|
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during path name resolution.</p>
|
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</div>
|
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</div>
|
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</div>
|
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<div class="sect1">
|
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<h2 id="sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-File_System-Limits"><a class="anchor" href="#sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-File_System-Limits"></a>File System Limits</h2>
|
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<div class="sectionbody">
|
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<div class="paragraph">
|
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<p>For historical reasons, there are preprocessor constants such as
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<code>PATH_MAX</code>, <code>NAME_MAX</code>.
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However, on most systems, the length of canonical path names
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(absolute path names with all symbolic links resolved, as
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returned by <code>realpath</code> or
|
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<code>canonicalize_file_name</code>) can exceed
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<code>PATH_MAX</code> bytes, and individual file name
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components can be longer than <code>NAME_MAX</code>. This
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is also true of the <code>_PC_PATH_MAX</code> and
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<code>_PC_NAME_MAX</code> values returned by
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<code>pathconf</code>, and the
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<code>f_namemax</code> member of <code>struct
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statvfs</code>. Therefore, these constants should not be
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used. This is also reason why the
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<code>readdir_r</code> should never be used (instead,
|
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use <code>readdir</code>).</p>
|
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</div>
|
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<div class="paragraph">
|
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<p>You should not write code in a way that assumes that there is an
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upper limit on the number of subdirectories of a directory, the
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number of regular files in a directory, or the link count of an
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inode.</p>
|
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</div>
|
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</div>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div class="sect1">
|
|
<h2 id="sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-File_System-Features"><a class="anchor" href="#sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-File_System-Features"></a>File system features</h2>
|
|
<div class="sectionbody">
|
|
<div class="paragraph">
|
|
<p>Not all file systems support all features. This makes it very
|
|
difficult to write general-purpose tools for copying files. For
|
|
example, a copy operation intending to preserve file permissions
|
|
will generally fail when copying to a FAT file system.</p>
|
|
</div>
|
|
<div class="ulist">
|
|
<ul>
|
|
<li>
|
|
<p>Some file systems are case-insensitive. Most should be
|
|
case-preserving, though.</p>
|
|
</li>
|
|
<li>
|
|
<p>Name length limits vary greatly, from eight to thousands of
|
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bytes. Path length limits differ as well. Most systems
|
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impose an upper bound on path names passed to the kernel,
|
|
but using relative path names, it is possible to create and
|
|
access files whose absolute path name is essentially of
|
|
unbounded length.</p>
|
|
</li>
|
|
<li>
|
|
<p>Some file systems do not store names as fairly unrestricted
|
|
byte sequences, as it has been traditionally the case on GNU
|
|
systems. This means that some byte sequences (outside the
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POSIX safe character set) are not valid names. Conversely,
|
|
names of existing files may not be representable as byte
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sequences, and the files are thus inaccessible on GNU
|
|
systems. Some file systems perform Unicode canonicalization
|
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on file names. These file systems preserve case, but
|
|
reading the name of a just-created file using
|
|
<code>readdir</code> might still result in a
|
|
different byte sequence.</p>
|
|
</li>
|
|
<li>
|
|
<p>Permissions and owners are not universally supported (and
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SUID/SGID bits may not be available). For example, FAT file
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systems assign ownership based on a mount option, and
|
|
generally mark all files as executable. Any attempt to
|
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change permissions would result in an error.</p>
|
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</li>
|
|
<li>
|
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<p>Non-regular files (device nodes, FIFOs) are not generally
|
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available.</p>
|
|
</li>
|
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<li>
|
|
<p>Only on some file systems, files can have holes, that is,
|
|
not all of their contents is backed by disk storage.</p>
|
|
</li>
|
|
<li>
|
|
<p><code>ioctl</code> support (even fairly generic
|
|
functionality such as <code>FIEMAP</code> for
|
|
discovering physical file layout and holes) is
|
|
file-system-specific.</p>
|
|
</li>
|
|
<li>
|
|
<p>Not all file systems support extended attributes, ACLs and
|
|
SELinux metadata. Size and naming restriction on extended
|
|
attributes vary.</p>
|
|
</li>
|
|
<li>
|
|
<p>Hard links may not be supported at all (FAT) or only within
|
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the same directory (AFS). Symbolic links may not be
|
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available, either. Reflinks (hard links with copy-on-write
|
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semantics) are still very rare. Recent systems restrict
|
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creation of hard links to users which own the target file or
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have read/write access to it, but older systems do not.</p>
|
|
</li>
|
|
<li>
|
|
<p>Renaming (or moving) files using <code>rename</code>
|
|
can fail (even when <code>stat</code> indicates that
|
|
the source and target directories are located on the same
|
|
file system). This system call should work if the old and
|
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new paths are located in the same directory, though.</p>
|
|
</li>
|
|
<li>
|
|
<p>Locking semantics vary among file systems. This affects
|
|
advisory and mandatory locks. For example, some network
|
|
file systems do not allow deleting files which are opened by
|
|
any process.</p>
|
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</li>
|
|
<li>
|
|
<p>Resolution of time stamps varies from two seconds to
|
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nanoseconds. Not all time stamps are available on all file
|
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systems. File creation time (<strong>birth
|
|
time</strong>) is not exposed over the
|
|
<code>stat</code>/<code>fstat</code>
|
|
interface, even if stored by the file system.</p>
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</li>
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</ul>
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</div>
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</div>
|
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</div>
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<div class="sect1">
|
|
<h2 id="sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-File_System-Free_Space"><a class="anchor" href="#sect-Defensive_Coding-Tasks-File_System-Free_Space"></a>Checking Free Space</h2>
|
|
<div class="sectionbody">
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|
<div class="paragraph">
|
|
<p>The <code>statvfs</code> and
|
|
<code>fstatvfs</code> functions allow programs to
|
|
examine the number of available blocks and inodes, through the
|
|
members <code>f_bfree</code>, <code>f_bavail</code>,
|
|
<code>f_ffree</code>, and <code>f_favail</code> of
|
|
<code>struct statvfs</code>. Some file systems return
|
|
fictional values in the <code>f_ffree</code> and
|
|
<code>f_favail</code> fields, so the only reliable way to
|
|
discover if the file system still has space for a file is to try
|
|
to create it. The <code>f_bfree</code> field should be
|
|
reasonably accurate, though.</p>
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